After two years of investigations, nothing came as a surprise. In general, the Bush-appointed Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction reported something the Bush administration had been telling the world since he was called out on Iraq's non-existent WMDs: the U.S. intelligence community was "dead wrong" about Iraq's pre-war WMD situation.
The report identifies many of the weaknesses that led to this misinformation, offering a scalding analysis of the state of the U.S. intelligence community. This tough assessment offers several possible ways to fix the problems of U.S. intelligence problems, a good first step in an eventual overhaul of the system. The next step, however, is an analysis of how this information is used once it gets to the White House.
While the report reiterated the intelligence breakdown that resulted in the misinformation of the campaign regarding Iraqi WMDs delivered to the United Nations, Congress and the American public, it did not explain how this obviously flawed information became synonymous with fact in the White House. The report discounted theories that information was purposely skewed or inappropriately emphasized due to political pressure. It did say political conditions of the time did not encourage skepticism of sources. While not directly critical of White House use of intelligence, the report said, "Intelligence analysts were too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam's intentions." Widespread preconceived notions often come from an institutional bias and, while the Bush administration might not have explicitly expected to find WMDs in Iraq, circumstances surrounding the administration -- many officials were heavily involved with the first Iraqi war, for example -- make it reasonable to expect a skepticism of Iraq, not where the information came from.
Though the general statement of the report was not new, specifics regarding sources and how little has changed since these intelligence errors were first revealed is disconcerting. The WMD Commission cited a 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that was the basis for much of Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations where he said Iraq definitely had WMDs. That NIE was proven to be an unmitigated failure, as the U.S. operation in Iraq revealed none of the weapons or conditions the NIE said existed. The commission said this failure is due to a lack of data collection and reliance on limited sources, a problem the commission seeks to rectify by moving away from a "fragmented, loosely managed" group of 15 organizations and create a post to unify those many branches.
The lack of data collection and reliance on weak sources is the scariest part of the problem, however. Military intelligence is a difficult art, but those who analyze the data must only use reliable information to make sweeping actions like going to war. The consequences of this irresponsibility are dire, and it seems until this point, the intelligence community was above reproach for these shoddy practices. Imagine if journalists consistently applied this practice of weak data collection and relying on only one source to their reports -- situations like the Dan Rather false document scandal at CBS would be commonplace, and false information that confirms institutional suspicions of the subject they are investigating turn into blinders.
The WMD commission report should be the light that exposes these misinformation scandals within the U.S. intelligence community. Its findings are a good start. But an infinite amount of reports like this will make no difference unless they study the mistakes involved in how the intelligence was used -- and that means looking at the Bush Administration's role.
Photo: Courtesy of Matthew Messina, from the RMBERS' Instagram page
